The extent to which people trust each other influences the performance of organizations to which they belong and the growth rates of countries in which they reside. Trust also positively impacts Internet adoption. We argue that trust levels can be increased through the use of trust enhancing mechanisms. Reputation management systems, such as ebay's Feedback Forum, are examples of such mechanisms in the context of e -business. Reputation management systems used by various online markets differ substantially but there has been little research done on the design of optimal mechanisms. Experimental economics provides a framework to measure trust and trust enhancement in a controlled laboratory environment. We present an experimental laboratory study examining the functionality of two ebay-like reputation management systems and the factors that influence their effectiveness.
3 productivity in the coming years [4, 5] . To the extent that productivity gains increase with the level of internet adoption, low trust countries, the majority of which tend to be of low and middle income, will take a double hit in terms of economic growth, penalized for low trust first in terms of direct impact on investment and growth, and then again through lower adoption of a growth-enhancing technology. In other words, we will observe a developmental-cum-digital-divide (see Figure 1 ). This is a bad message for the low-trust countries. However, there might be ways to mitigate the implications. In specific situations, trust can be enhanced or complemented by related factors. In Section 2 we identify some of these factors and illustrate a case of successful trust enhancement in the context of Internet transactions by reputation managementebay's Feedback Forum. 1 However successful, ebay's Feedback Forum shows a number of shortcomings, which leads us to the question how ebay's reputation management system could be improved upon. In section 3 we present a new methodology appropriate to answer this type of question in the experimental economics laboratory. Section 4 concludes this article.
2) Trust enhancement and the ebay example
Trust is typically assigned the role of solving problems caused by social uncertainty when we are incapable of correctly determining the intentions of other persons o r organizations having (monetary) incentives to act against our own best interest. Following Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) we define trust as the expectation of other persons' goodwill and benign intent, implying that in certain situations those persons will place the interests of others before their own [7] . Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) distinguish trust from assurance, which they define as the expectation of another person's goodwill and benign intent based on the knowledge of the incentive structure surrounding the relationship. They give the following example:
Suppose I have a special tie with the Mafia, and my trading partner knows this. I am certain that he will not cheat on me; he knows that if he does he will be quickly sent to a mortuary. My expectation of the partner's "honesty" is based on the fact that acting "honestly" is in his own interest, not on the belief that he is a benevolent person. Here, assurance exists but no trust. (Yamagishi and
Yamagishi 1994, p. 132) Assurance can thus complement or substitute for trust.
A related trust substitute is commitment. Maintaining long-term relationships with loyal partners rather than making deals with new partners is a kind of commitment where incentives for non-cooperative behavior are reduced. 2 In such relationships it is mutual assurance based on the nature of the relationship rather than trust that leads to cooperative behavior. This was demonstrated, for example, by Axelrod (1984) , Selten, Mitzkewitz and Uhlich (1997) and Keser (2000) who examined human strategies in repeated "social dilemma situations" where the individually payoff maximizing non-cooperative behavior leads to socially inefficient outcomes [8, 9, 10] : 3 people often actively attempt to establish and maintain mutual cooperation when they expect to repeatedly interact with each other.
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In early interactions they signal their willingness to cooperate and then use reciprocitycooperate if the other(s) cooperated and defect from cooperation if the other(s) defected in the previous interactionas an instrument to establish cooperation.
Following such a strategy typically pays for an individual that is involved in many repeated encounters with others. Keser and van Winden (2000) show that in a social dilemma situation people who interact w ith the same others ("partners") cooperate significantly more than those who interact in each repetition with others who are randomly associated to them ("strangers") [11] .
Also familiarity can be seen as a complement to trust [12] . Familiarity deals with the understanding of the current action of another person while trust deals with the beliefs about future actions of another person. The latter may often be based on familiarity.
Familiarity with Amazon.com, for example, would be the knowledge of how to search for books and information about them and how to order these books through the website interface. Trust in Amazon.com might entail willingness to provide credit card information based on the belief that the information will not be inappropriately used in the future. Though trust and familiarity are distinctly different, they are related.
Another trust complement or trust enhancing factor is reputation. [13] . These numbers are impressive given the risks involved in trading on such a market. Typically there is no opportunity for a buyer to inspect the item for which he has paid before delivery, and if he isn't satisfied with the quality, it may be impossible for him to track down the seller. Even worse, the buyer has no guarantee that the item will be delivered at all. The seller, on the other hand, if he chooses to deliver before receiving the payment f aces similar risks with respect to the buyer. To put it differently, each of the parties involved in a trade might be tempted to cheat. Ebay has a fraud protection program that covers losses for up to $200. However, beyond that, if users do not want to make use of costly escrow services that ebay also offers, they must bring a large portion of trust when they engage in transactions on this informal online market.
To enhance trust and trustworthiness of its users ebay created its Feedback
Forum. In addition to textual comments, the participants in a transaction are asked to rate each other with a "+1" for a positive comment, a "-1" for a negative comment or a "0" for a neutral comment. (2) compared sales under newcomer identities with and without negative feedback [17] . They observed (1) that the established identity fared better than the newcomer identity, and (2) that among the newcomers, one or two negative f eedbacks showed no price effects. These empirical and experimental field studies thus show that the reputation heterogeneity created by ebay's reputation management system leads to 8 price dispersion, which was assumed to be minimized on online markets due to reduced buyer search cost [18] . We are aware of no field study, however, that examines the function of specific aspects of reputation management systems and, in particular, their impact on trust and trustworthiness.
Although the reported fraud rate at ebay is as low as one percent of all listings, there are recurring incidents of fraud that may be due to shortcomings in the reputation management system. Dingledine, Freedman and Molnar (2001) for example observed the following non-unique incident [19] : PEZ dispensers may enjoy an excellent reputation among PEZ dispenser buyers. He might, however, be lousy at selling a car on ebay. This could be unintentional due, for example, to lack of experience or it could be a matter of intent: a car represents a much higher value than a PEZ dispenser. The strategy of building reputation on low-value deals only to misuse the reputation on high-value deals could also be discouraged by modifications in the reputation function: for example, high-value deals could be weighed more heavily than low-value deals in the construction of the Feedback Rating number.
Fraud might also be discouraged by making it more difficult for traders to change their identity. A user with a negative reputation has, in the current version of the Feedback Forum, an incentive to reappear on the market with a new identity t hat comes along with a neutral reputation. Without going into further detail, we conclude that many potentially beneficial modifications could be made to ebay's Feedback Forum. One cannot always foresee the implications such modifications have on the behavior of users and the general performance of the reputation management system. Experimenting in the field can be costly and time consuming. Furthermore, it is unlikely that we can control the environment to the extent that we would like to. We thus propose to examine the effectiveness of different rating systems in controlled laboratory experiments. In the following we present a specific way to measure trust, trustworthiness, and the enhancement of both through reputation management in the experimental economics laboratory.
3) Designing reputation mechanisms fast prototyping using experimental game theory
In a model e -business environment, we want to consider the interaction of individuals in an abstract situation involving trust on one side and trustworthiness on the other. We do not necessarily want a one-to-one translation of the ebay auction situation, as the auction design involves other issues that, at this point, we want to keep isolated from the trust question. 5 In the experimental economics literature, Berg, Dickhaut, and
McCabe (1995) introduced the following "investment game", often also called the "trust game" [22] .
The two players in this game-let us denote them as buyer and seller-are endowed with $10 each. Buyer and seller may interact according to the following rules, of which they both have full knowledge. The buyer may send (invest) part or all of his endowment to the seller, but he need not send anything. The amount invested by the buyer will be tripled, so that the seller will receive three times the amount invested by the buyer. 6 The seller then has the opportunity to return part or all of the amount he received, but he need not return anything. Then the game is over.
Suppose that the two players in this game are, as typically assumed in economic theory, egoists who are striving to maximize their personal payoffs. Suppose further that each assumes the other's objective is to maximize his or her own personal payoff. The game can then easily be solved by backward induction: a seller who egoistically maximizes his personal payoff will not return anything to the buyer, whatever amount the latter invested. The buyer, also striving to maximize his personal payoff and anticipating the zero return by the seller, will not send anything to the seller. Thus, economic theory predicts zero flow of money in this game.
In the experimental laboratory, as in real life, we often observe people behaving Rain Forest, Kenya, and the urban and rural Missouri [25] :
"…[t]he results [of the trust game] indicate that in the small-scale societies of the developing world, there is less trust, and in the United States there is more (in both rural and urban Missouri)." (Ensminger 2002, p.13)
The situation described by the trust game relates, the auctioning aspect being abstracted away, to trading on online markets. The focus is on the issues of trust and trustworthiness. If I buy PEZ dispensers at ebay I face risks similar to those of the buyer in the trust game: is the quality as described, will the packaging be appropriate, will the delivery be in a timely fashion, will the item be delivered at all? The seller on ebay may be considered in the role of the seller in the trust game in as far as his or her trustworthiness is at stake. Although the trust game, due to the tripling of the buyer's investment, does not directly translate into the ebay transaction, it captures in a simple way its major issues of trust and trustworthiness. The tripling of the investment corresponds to the existence of gains from trade in the buyer-seller context. As discussed in Section 2 above, it is to be assumed that at ebay the buyer's risks with respect to the seller's trustworthiness are somewhat mitigated owing to the Feedback Forum. 7 On the one hand, the seller's reputation provides a signal that is likely to influence the buyer's expectation of trustworthiness; on the other h and, the fear of being negatively rated might make sellers behave in a more trustworthy way.
In Keser (2002) , we have designed, based on the trust game, computerized laboratory experiments that examine the functionality of such reputation management systems [26] . The big advantage of using the laboratory experimental method, compared to field studies or experiments, is that we can directly compare a situation without a where cooperation tends to break down toward the end [27] .
In terms of payoff, the major winners from the introduction of a reputation management system are the buyers, which is due to the fact that, with a reputation To summarize the results, the introduction of a reputation management system significantly increases both the transaction volume (trust) and the level of trustworthiness. Defining efficiency as the percent of the maximal possible sum of payoffs to buyer and seller, we observe that the overall efficiency increases from 70 percent in the baseline to 76 percent in the short-run and to 80 percent in the long-run reputation experiment owing to the increased trust level. The introduction of a reputation management system leads to a Pareto improvement as both player types earn higher payoffs. At the same time, the payoff distribution between buyers and sellers becomes more equitable. This is due to the fact that in an environment with a reputation management system in place engaging in a transaction that requires trust will, in aggregate, pay, which is not the case in an environment without any reputation management system. Comparing the two reputation experiments, we observe that the management of long-run reputation leads, in the intermediate phase of the interaction, to more trust and trustworthiness than the management of purely short-run reputation.
4) Conclusion
We started our discussion with the observation that trust plays an important role at the level of individual transactions, organizations and the economic performance of a country. Differences in trust across countries exist. In specific contests, there are, however ways for low-trust countries to substitute or enhance trust by other factors. In ebusiness we observe successful trust enhancement through reputation management systems. However, there is no standard reputation management system (each online market uses its own design) nor even a set of guidelines for designing effective systems [28] . We suggest using the methodology of experimental game theory for the design of efficient reputation management systems.
The experiments presented in Keser (2002) shown, for example, that even among relatively high trust countries there may be significant differences in privacy concerns [6] . 2 Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) argue that this is typical for Japanese firms.
3 Axelrod (1984) considered the so-called prisoner's dilemma game, Selten, Mitzkewitz and Uhlich (1997) a Cournot oligopoly, and Keser (2000) a public goods game. 4 Amazon.com uses a different feedback system. A ny time a buyer makes a purchase from a seller he or she is encouraged to rate the seller's performance and leave a short comment. The average ratings accompany a seller's name in every reference and appear as one to five stars, with five stars being the best. Also Half.com uses 5 rating categories, numbers from 1 ("poor") to 5 ("excellent") and characterizes each user by the average rating. 5 The auction design on online markets per se is a highly interesting question that has been addressed by, for example, Roth and Ockenfels (2002) and Ockenfels and Roth (2002) [20, 21] . The role of trust in the auction framework is part of our future research agenda.
